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URBAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE
PROMISE OF FOR-PROFIT PHILANTHROPY
VICTOR FLEISCHER *
INTRODUCTION

The entrepreneurial spirit is universal. Challenges to raising
capital vary from region to region, however, making a comparative
analysis of entrepreneurship a potentially fruitful inquiry. The fo
cus of the conference, of course, is on urban entrepreneurship,
which I understand to mean start-up businesses in economically dis
advantaged urban areas. Entrepreneurs seeking investment for
projects in urban areas face unusual barriers in raising capital. The
chief problem, I think, is that many urban projects, even profitable
ones, are slow-growth projects; traditional venture capital seeks out
investments in new technologies that promise to disrupt existing
product markets, thereby generating the outsized returns that sup
port the venture capital business model. Traditional solutions to
the urban-entrepreneurship challenge include community networks,
investments from nonprofits, and investment tax credits, but, as I
explain, each of these solutions suffers from significant limitations.
A promising alternative is emerging, however: for-profit philan
thropy-altruistic investments guided by the discipline and account
ability of for-profit venture investing.! While no panacea, for-profit
philanthropy may supplement the other efforts necessary to make
urban environments more conducive to entrepreneurship.
I.

THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT Is UNIVERSAL

Evidence of the entrepreneurial spirit is tucked away in all
sorts of places, from locales we normally think of-like Boulder

* Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. This Essay is based
on my remarks at the Current Issues in Community Economic Development Confer
ence held at the Western New England College School of Law on March 30, 2007. I
thank my research assistant, George Green, for his assistance in preparing these
remarks.
1. On the desirability of for-profit charities as institutions, albeit outside the en
trepreneurship context, see generally Eric A. Posner & Anup Malani, The Case for For
Profit Charities (Univ. Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 304,2006), available
at http://ssrn.comJabstracUd=928976.
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and Silicon Valley-to large cities like Los Angeles and New York.
The entrepreneurial spirit also thrives in rural areas of the United
States, as well as throughout Europe and Israel, in India and China,
and in Africa and Latin America. 2 Urban areas of the United
States are no exception, of course.
Differences in human capital exist. For example, a CEO in a
struggling inner-city environment in the Rust Belt may have to
devote more hours to training workers than a CEO in Silicon Val
ley.3 But I am skeptical of explanations of entrepreneurship that
place too much weight on vague descriptions of entrepreneurial cul
ture or attitude. Culture in this broad sense may also prove difficult
to change, at least in a positive direction, through government
regulation.
Nor should we ignore the importance of venturesome consum
ers.4 Consumers who are locked into comfortable patterns, or who
are distrustful of change, present an additional obstacle to entrepre
neurs seeking to disrupt product markets. For the remainder of this
Essay, then, I will focus on regional variations in seeking invest
ment capital.
Consider the barriers to raising investment capital. In general,
investors have two needs: (1) a legal regime that makes them com
fortable investing in a venture managed by someone else, and that
is relatively free from corruption and confiscatory taxes; and (2) a
belief that they will achieve a satisfactory return on their invest
ments relative to the risk of loss.5 The United States has a legal
regime that, for the most part, is supportive of entrepreneurs. This
is generally true in urban environments, as well as in Silicon Valley.
The greater challenge facing urban entrepreneurs is convincing in
vestors that they will receive a sufficient return on their investment.
2. See generally NIELS BOSMA & REBECCA HARDING, GLOBAL ENTREPRENEUR
SHIP MONITOR, GEM 2006 SUMMARY RESULTS (2007), available at http://www.gem
consortium.orgldownload.asp?fid=532 (describing the results of a cross-country entre
preneurship study of forty-two countries).
3. See generally Edward L. Glaeser, Entrepreneurship and the City (Harvard Inst.
of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2139, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1001108 (finding a strong connection between area-level education and
entrepreneurship).
4. See Amar Bhide, Venturesome Consumption, Innovation and Globalization,
Paper for a Joint Conference at CESifo and the Center on Capitalism and Society:
Perspectives on the Performance of the Continent's Economies 1 (2006), available at
http://www.bhide.netlbhide_venturesome30nsumption.pdf.
5. For a useful discussion, see Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A
Review of Issues, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1320 (1997).
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In seeking to overcome this challenge, urban entrepreneurs
face an enormous information barrier. Entrepreneurs have to
somehow convince investors that their business plan has greater
growth potential than other small business proposals. This is a
greater challenge in the urban context because many urban busi
ness model ideas don't fit the traditional venture capital paradigm.
Venture capital-backed entrepreneurship tends to focus on technol
ogies that have the potential to disrupt existing product markets
and generate enormous returns. 6 It's these spectacular home run
investments that can justify "nosebleed" valuations and allow inves
tors to swallow the losses from the significant number of invest
ments that will fail.7 Many urban start-ups, by contrast, are looking
for success on a smaller scale. This doesn't necessarily diminish
their importance to social welfare, but it does reduce their chances
of finding traditional venture capital.
II.

No

CLEAR PATH TO CASH

There are untapped product markets and underutilized labor
markets in urban areas,s and it's possible for venture capital-backed
entrepreneurs to reach a portion of these markets. There's no in
trinsic barrier to funding; nor is there a conspiracy that makes
profit-seeking venture capitalists turn away from urban markets. I
recently saw a pitch by a company called GoUrban.net, which
wants to be an Internet portal and online retailer for the urban mar
ket. 9 I think it will find traditional venture capital funding-but
only if it can convince the venture capitalists that the business is
truly disruptive of existing product markets. If, on the other hand,
the portal only looks like it facilitates the entry of new users into
the web commerce arena who would rather spend their cash else
where, GoUrban.net will have trouble finding funding. But, in that
sense, the challenges facing GoUrban.net are not fundamentally
different from other technology companies.
6. See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1737, 1764 (1994) (discussing and defining the "home run mentality" in venture
capital investing as receiving a return that is greater than two times the investment);
Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77, 90 (2005).
7. Fleischer, supra note 6, at 90.
8. See, e.g., Lee Romney, Retailers See Gold in Poor Areas, L.A. TIMES, May 12,
2001, at 1; Robert Sharoff, Book Chain Taps Underserved Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2004, at C6 (describing Borders Books and Music's efforts to place stores in
untapped urban areas).
9. GoUrban.net, http://www.gourban.netJabout.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
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The tougher challenge is for slow-growth companies, like
smaller retail businesses, grocery stores, bakeries, laundromats,
clothing stores, for-profit educators, and many service providers.
Many of these companies can provide incremental improvements
over the status quo, but it's unlikely that they will disrupt entire
product markets. In this context, the more logical sources of capital
are traditional corporations that extend incrementally into new
markets through franchises or by opening stores in new areas, as
companies like Wal-Mart, Target, and Starbucks are trying to do.1°
For example, suppose there's an entrepreneur who wants to
open a new store on 125th Street in Harlem that will sell a line of
upscale men's shoes primarily to the African American consumer
market in the area. Should she make a pitch to traditional venture
capitalists? Probably not. Venture capitalists simply are not likely
to supply the needed capital to this market. No matter how impres
sive the entrepreneur, venture capitalists won't make the invest
ment because the business model-upscale men's shoes-isn't
inherently disruptive. Without the promise of a home run product,
slow-growth companies simply won't attract traditional venture
capital. Unless she can pitch the company as the next Crocsll-and
who saw that one coming?-the road to venture capital will be a
long haul. As with any other market, there's a huge information
gap between the entrepreneur with the idea and the investors with
the capital.
III.

COMMUNITY NETWORKS, NONPROFITS, AND TAX CREDITS:
THE TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS

There are a handful of traditional solutions for finding capital
for urban entrepreneurship. The first is community networking.
Frequently, this just means informal associations of friends and
family that provide capital to small business owners, even when the
return on the investment is quite uncertain.12 They rely on noncon
tractual methods to guard against shirking and other moral hazard
10. See, e.g., Craig Harris, Starbucks Wants to Open 40,000 New Stores, SEATTLE
PosT-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 5, 2006, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.comlbusiness/
287643_sbuxgrow05ww.html; News Release, Target Corp., Target to Open 60 New
Stores (Oct. 7, 2005), http://investors.target.com!phoenix.zhtml?c=65828&p=irol-new
sArticIe&ID=765407&highlight=; Wal-Mart Sees Room for Over 1,500 New Stores,
MSNBC.coM, Feb. 8, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11233081/.
11. Crocs, Our History, http://www.crocs.com!companylhistory/ (discussing how
Crocs went from merely "boating/outdoor" shoes to a "bona-fide phenomenon").
12. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communi
ties and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 116 (2004) (asserting
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risks.1 3 Historically, these networks have tended to be ethnically
homogeneous, and often, but not always, centered around immi
grant groups.14 In New York, for example, there are-just to name
a few-Korean grocers, Orthodox Jews in the diamond district, and
African American bakeries in Harlem. But, family and ethnic ties
only extend so far, and the model becomes less useful as our urban
communities become more heterogeneous. Further, as a matter of
public policy we cannot count on financing from friends and family
to generate the optimal level of economic activity.
Some nonprofits try to pick up where community networks
stop. Examples include the New Hampshire Community Loan
Fund,15 the Minority Business Enterprise Center,16 and the Self
Help Ventures Fund,17 each of which provides start-up financing to
underserved communities. The trouble is that nonprofits have a
tendency to suffer from a lack of accountability because nonprofit
managers are agents without principals. Without the profit motive
to guide behavior, there's a greater risk that nonprofit managers
choose suboptimal projects.1 8 Similarly, it's difficult for donors or
investors to monitor what's going on. 19
Tax credits offer another, albeit limited, method of moving
capital to urban entrepreneurs. Under the New Markets Tax
Credit, for example, investors can receive a tax credit, staggered
over seven years, for up to thirty-nine percent of their investment in
low-income communities through government-certified in
termediaries. 20 While the scheme likely lowers the cost of capital
that "[t]he presence of community may be especially important for the poor who rely
on it as a form of insurance or risk sharing").
13. See Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards
a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2351-52 (2004)
(describing how community networks can serve as robust private law mechanisms for
enforcing industry norms).
14. Id. at 2344-45 (describing the ethnic homogeneity of cotton-mill owners and
the even greater homogeneity of Orthodox Jewish diamond dealers in New York City).
15. N.H. Cmty. Loan Fund, Coos County Entrepreneurial Investment Program,
http://www.nhcIf.org/newsffillotson.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
16. Minority Bus. Enter. Ctr., About Us, http://www.mbecwa.comlaboutlindex.
html (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
17. Self-Help Ventures Fund, Commercial Lending, http://www.self-help.org/
commerciallending/index.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
18. See generally, e.g., Symposium, Who Guards the Guardians?: Monitoring and
Enforcement of Charity Governance, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 543 (2005) (discussing law
enforcement and reform).
19. See generally id.
20. Cmty. Dev. Fin. Inst. Fund, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, New Markets Tax Credits
Program, http://www.cdfifund.gov/whacwe_do/programs_id.asp?programID=5 (last
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for certain projects, it's difficult to assess whether the best projects
are getting funded. 21 Further, it's not clear to what extent the tax
credit is, in fact, causing an increase in investment in low-income
communities. 22 The Byzantine planning requirements provide mul
tiple opportunities for rent seeking and hardly suggest an efficient
structure. 23
Entrepreneurs must also develop specialized human capital to
acquire tax credits-either by learning the process themselves, or
finding intermediaries such as nonprofits and lawyers who can assist
them with the funding process. Just as urban entrepreneurs may
not be familiar with the path to traditional venture capital, they also
may be unfamiliar with the tax credit world, placing them at a com
parative disadvantage with seasoned businesses. In the real estate
context, for example, we often observe repeat players applying for
low-income housing tax credits.24 This suggests that the complexity
of the tax credit programs creates its own unique barrier to entry.
I don't mean to suggest that community networks, nonprofits,
and tax credits can't be useful sources of support for urban entre
preneurship. But there seem to be significant limitations, particu
larly for new entrepreneurs and for ambitious companies that seek
faster growth rates.

visited Apr. 5, 2007); see U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX POLICY: NEW
MARKETS TAX CREDIT ApPEARS TO INCREASE INVESTMENT BY INVESTORS IN Low
INCOME COMMUNITIES, BUT OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO BETTER MONITOR COMPLIANCE
(2007) [hereinafter GAO TAX POLICY], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d07296.pdf.
21. For a discussion of government intervention in venture capital markets, see
Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067 (2003).
22. GAO TAX POLICY, supra note 20, at 53 ("[GAO's] statistical evidence may
only establish an association between the credit and increased investment, not that the
program causes the increase. In any case, the indication that the program increases
investment is not sufficient to support conclusions about the program's effectiveness
.... ").
23. Id. at 7. "The process of making a[] [New Market Tax Credit] investment
involves several steps and a number of stakeholders." !d. The report then goes on to
describe the elaborate process by which an intermediary can become certified to pro
vide tax credits to its investors, the process by which applicants can seek capital from
these investors, and the method for evaluating the suitability and worthiness of appli
cants. Id.
24. See Nestor Davidson, Values and Value Creation by Lawyers in Public-Private
Transactions (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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FOR-PROFIT PHILANTHROPY AS A USEFUL ALTERNATIVE

For-profit philanthropy, while no panacea for urban problems,
might be a valuable (and currently"underutilized) alternative source
of capital for urban entrepreneurship. As I use the term here, for
profit philanthropy means an investment guided by traditional, for
profit principles of accountability and return on investment, but
where the primary motivation for the investment is altruistic. These
ventures might generate a profit, but if so, it's just gravy. The real
motivation is giving something back to the community, and this
philanthropic impulse helps investors stomach greater uncertainty
and take on greater risk than they would otherwise take, given the
expected returns. The following are three examples of for-profit
philanthropy.

A.

Angels

In the venture capital context, angel investors bridge the gap
between financing a new business yourself (or with the help of fam
ily) and the first round of venture-capital financing. Angels are
often former entrepreneurs with some knowledge of the underlying
industry. For example, a software entrepreneur might look to foun
ders of successful software companies to get some p.arly funding.
Angels typically take a minority equity stake in the new business
and often serve formally on the board of directors or offer informal
advice and mentoring to the entrepreneur. If all goes well, in a few
months, or a year or two, the company will then seek venture fi
nancing, at which point venture capitalists will take over the lead
role in counseling and guiding the company towards an initial pub
lic offering or other exit.
Angel investors are normally thought of as for-profit investors,
not philanthropists. 25 But when you talk to angels, it becomes clear
that many subscribe to a much broader mission. 26 Many are former
entrepreneurs who see angel investing as a method of giving the
next generation a hand up. As Professor Ibrahim has documented,
25. For an analysis of angel investing that assumes a for-profit motive, see John L.
Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A Proposal to Expand
the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
861 (2005).
26. See Posting of Gillian Parrillo to Sacramento Executive, What Kind of Angel
Are You?, http://www.sacramentoexecutive.comI2006/02/whaCkind_oCangel_are_you.
html (Feb. 13, 2006, 12:39 PST).

100

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:93

many angels value the social benefits of angel investing. 27 Angels
can participate in the excitement of being part of a start-up, and
"stave off the boredom of retirement. "28 Angels often invest close
to home, so they can visit and consult with founders. Many invest
in ventures that may generate broader social welfare gains, like
greentech and cleantech, or that will produce jobs in the angel's
community.29 "Psychic income" becomes an important factor. 3D
Once in a while, of course, an angel investment turns into mil
lions of dollars. 31 The profit motive is often present alongside these
other nonfinancial motivations. But that is precisely the attraction
of for-profit philanthropy; it has become a method of providing
both the money and discipline of venture capital to a start-up that
isn't yet ready to receive traditional venture capital.
B.

Google.org

Google.org is the "philanthropic arm" of Google. 32 It invests
in projects such as providing market-based solutions to global pov
erty33 and creating a better hybrid car. 34 By keeping the projects
under the for-profit umbrella of Google, the Google founders and
managers are likely to achieve more accountability than if they
made a corporate charitable contribution to an outside nonprofit.
Additionally, it's worth noting that, while it may seem counter
intuitive, Google still gets a pretty good tax break. In For-Profit
Charities, Professors Eric Posner and Anup Malani suggest that we
should allow for-profit entities engaging in charitable activities to
receive deductible contributions of capital and operate free from an
entity-level tax. 35 Google.org achieves the same improvement in
27. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior ofAngel Investors 33
(Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 07-16, 2007), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract=984899.
28. ld. at 32.
29. See id. at 33.
30. /d.
31. Jeanne Lee, How to Fund Other Startups (And Get Rich), CNNMoNEY.coM,
May 31, 2006, http://money.cnn.coml2006/05/30/smbusiness/angels_wealthbuilders_fsb/
index.htm (describing some home run angel investments).
32. Google.org, Welcome to Google.org, http://www.google.org/ (last visited Apr.
9,2007).
33. Google.org, Global Economic Development, http://www.google.org/develop
ment.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
34. Google.org, Climate Change, http://www.google.org/climate.html (last visited
Oct. 10, 2007).
35. 26 U.S.c. § 501(c)(3) (2000). The mechanics that would be used are unclear
from the early draft of the paper. Posner & Malani, supra note 1, at 18.
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accountability and significant tax benefits, but without creating the
same sort of nightmare of administrative compliance that changing
the tax code would require in this context. When Google puts
money into its Google.org subsidiary, and the subsidiary spends the
money on things like research and development, the .org subsidiary
will quickly generate operating losses. Assuming the .org subsidi
ary remains part of the parent company's consolidated tax return,
the operating losses will soak up income from Google's normal
profit-making activities. Not all of the money contributed to the
.org will generate immediate deductions-some investments will be
capitalized, and some will later generate income. But each dollar
contributed to Google.org might generate, say, twenty or twenty
five cents of tax benefits to Google, versus thirty-five cents, at most,
for a corporate charitable contribution. At the same time
Google.org can operate free from both the income tax charitable
deduction adjusted gross income limitations and the definitional
constraints of § 501(c)(3).36
The Google.org model is attractive in part because the .org
subsidiary can draw on the resources and expertise of the rest of the
Google team. Unlike traditional nonprofits, which for tax reasons
must limit profit-seeking activities, the philanthropic arm of Google
can blur the lines and draw on expertise from the entire
organiza tion.
C.

Magic Johnson

A third example, returning to the urban context, is Johnson
Development Corporation. 37 The corporation and its founder,
Earvin "Magic" Johnson, have succeeded in bringing retail centers
and entertainment complexes to underserved urban markets,
largely by forging partnerships with traditional for-profit corpora
tions like Washington Mutual, Starbucks, and TGI Fridays.38 The
success of these various arrangements highlights the discipline and
accountability of for-profit ventures. 39
36. See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Why Limit Charity? (Univ. Ill. Law & Econ.,
Research Paper No. LE07-020, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=993541.
37. Johnson Dev. Corp., Our Mission, http://www.johnsondevelopmentcorp.coml
main.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
38. See id.
39. Id.; see also Johnson Dev. Corp., Magic Johnson Theaters, http://www.
johnsondevelopmentcorp.comltheaters/index.html (last visited Oct. 11,2007) [hereinaf
ter Magic Johnson Theaters].
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But I would be surprised if profit was Mr. Johnson's sole or
even primary motivation when he first partnered with Sony En
tertainment to build the Magic Johnson Theaters back in 1994.40 At
the time, there was significant uncertainty about whether the busi
ness model would work. Mr. Johnson was not just a founder and
capital provider, but also an intermediary who could bridge the gap
between the other capital providers and the urban community that
the businesses served. I suspect that Mr. Johnson, like many suc
cessful entrepreneurs, was looking to give something back to the
community, and the for-profit model has made that gift more suc
cessful than a straight donation would have been. For-profit philan
thropy is the gift that keeps on giving.
CONCLUSION

Urban entrepreneurs operate under conditions of great uncer
tainty that make it difficult to raise money from traditional sources.
Unlike technology entrepreneurs, who also operate under condi
tions of great uncertainty, urban entrepreneurs often cannot court
venture capital with the dreams of disrupting entire product mar
kets. Relying on friends and family, traditional nonprofits, and tax
credits have proved insufficient to bridge the entire funding gap.
For-profit philanthropy presents an exciting new model to create
some of the most exciting urban ventures of the twenty-first
century.

40.

Magic Johnson Theaters, supra note 39.

